[simmons_5251]

Originally Posted by Richard46

OK but to be fair you have problems with the existence of any kind of reality; right?

Epistemologically and metaphysically, but we ought to assume axioms for the sake of debate.

Originally Posted by bleuh111

We do think quite alike, it seems. I did (and do) hold a view that is virtually identical to what you've said - that things like abstract shapes can be said to exist as concepts, but not actualised instances. The "did" part is in that I'm currently trying to re-evaluate my position on that. But this is a tangent and not why I created the thread. I'd be curious in your answer, actually, Simmons - would you say you can imagine a circumstance in which there can be a claimed difference between a statement of "is" and "exists"? This is puzzling me at the moment.

EDIT: For example, "there is a difference between a square and a circle" - now I'd think that would mean I can truthfully say "a difference between a square and a circle exists", but how can a difference exist? Can a difference be said to exist? After all, I rested my claim that certain models of God fail because they mean God cannot claim to have created the difference between existence and non-existence, yet such a difference clearly exists (God can't take credit because at any point there was no difference, God ceases to exist or not exist and thus can no longer be said to have a will or consciousness to have created anything, was the gist of my arguement there). If a difference can be said to exist, what implications does that have for what we mean by exists and does it change the equivalence of statements of "there is" against "exists"?

Indeed.

I would say "is" refers more to the phenomenological aspect of an object. Such as, That table over there is, because I experiance it.

Exists I would say is to do with the noumenon, the object beneath the experiance, and to say that table exists, is to refer to that.

I can't quite put my finger on it, and that distinction seems vauge and full of holes, yet I think there is a difference between Is and exist, and furthermore to "be".

EDIT:

Ah now you put it like that i took it out of context.

Yes to me there is a difference, yet a difference does not exist. Existence implies an instance, yet is implies the concept (to me). There is a logical jump created by the mind in perceiving two things to pertain a difference, personally I think the mind is a concept rather than an instance, and therefore I'm inclined to think that the difference is also a concept which exists only in the mind, not in reality.

But surely God is omniscient, therefore he knows a priori what it is to not-exist despite having never existed?

[bleuh111]

Originally Posted by simmons_5251

Epistemologically and metaphysically, but we ought to assume axioms for the sake of debate.


Indeed.

I would say "is" refers more to the phenomenological aspect of an object. Such as, That table over there is, because I experiance it.

Exists I would say is to do with the noumenon, the object beneath the experiance, and to say that table exists, is to refer to that.

I can't quite put my finger on it, and that distinction seems vauge and full of holes, yet I think there is a difference between Is and exist, and furthermore to "be".

Sorry, after you replied, I edited my post this responds to with an addition, which I have also copied below, as you wouldn't have known about it when you replied:

For example, "there is a difference between a square and a circle" - now I'd think that would mean I can truthfully say "a difference between a square and a circle exists", but how can a difference exist? Can a difference be said to exist? After all, I rested my claim that certain models of God fail because they mean God cannot claim to have created the difference between existence and non-existence, yet such a difference clearly exists (God can't take credit because at any point there was no difference, God ceases to exist or not exist and thus can no longer be said to have a will or consciousness to have created anything, was the gist of my arguement there). If a difference can be said to exist, what implications does that have for what we mean by exists and does it change the equivalence of statements of "there is" against "exists"?

EDIT: Perhaps another way of looking at my argument from my previous thread though is that what I can be said to be positing is that it's not so much that "existence exists" or "non existence exists", but that existence and non-existence are two fundamental states of reality from which all else can then be said to either exist or not exist. So it's kind of tempting to say they both "exist", but what I'm really putting forward in my website's claims is those being polarisations of a single transexistential state, so really, in terms of what my site talked about, existence and non-existence should be considered part of that single state rather than things in their own right that can be said to exist or not.

[hooter]

Originally Posted by bleuh111

Or a square that is also a circle.

That's an inherent logical contradiction; intuitively, we all know that as squares and circles are totally incongruent and incompatible shapes, a square that is also a circle is by definition impossible.

Therefore "There is no such thing as a circular square" would seem like an entirely truthful and in no way controversial statement.

Many of us would also intuitively regard the above statement as semantically equivalent to stating "A circular square does not exist".

Yet when phrased in this second form, the statement can be seen as controversial and not necessarily something we can just accept as true as we would when we say it in the first form.

If I cannot conceive of a circular square, what position am I in to make statements about whether it does or does not exist? And what does this say about the perceived equivalency of "there is" against "exists"?

This is a problem I was reading about last night from eminent philosophers' points of view and considering the problem myself.

I think DS:GD gives a reasonable cross-section of a population. Probably not a strong enough cross-section that polls conducted here, for example, would be expected to mirror closely the result of a poll conducted of a statistically representative sample from the UK's entire population, but still, there is unarguably as wide range of demographics represented here.

So what I want to know, for the purposes of writing up my thoughts on the issue of the circular square from an ontological viewpoint, is this: how does the average person here see/reconcile this problem? Can you say "there is no such thing as a circular square"? Can you say "a circular square does not exist"? Do you view those two statements as identical in meaning?

Crumbs have you had to much coffee tonight...cors yer brain appears to have gorn into over-drive

[Richard46]

OK bleuh but who wrote this essay you where reading?

[spiney2]

Originally Posted by simmons_5251

Epistemologically and metaphysically, but we ought to assume axioms for the sake of debate.


Indeed.

I would say "is" refers more to the phenomenological aspect of an object. Such as, That table over there is, because I experiance it.

Exists I would say is to do with the noumenon, the object beneath the experiance, and to say that table exists, is to refer to that.

I can't quite put my finger on it, and that distinction seems vauge and full of holes, yet I think there is a difference between Is and exist, and furthermore to "be".

wot is this garbage?

noumenon is a kantian invention. he also said: existence is not a predicate !

[bleuh111]

Originally Posted by Richard46

OK bleuh but who wrote this essay you where reading?

I don't know and don't have it to hand anymore. It was not written by any famous philosopher or anything, I think it was just an archived essay from a regular academic. But it kept referencing some part of the debates between Russell and Meinong and raised the issue of a rectangular circle and something to do with a difference between "there is" and "exists" that I don't think I fully understand. As this issue is relevant to some hobby writing I'm doing, I wanted to know if anyone else would see a difference, as well as confirm most people wouldn't see a diference and would agree that a square circle cannot exist.

[spiney2]

are we in fact discussing dasein ?

http://royby.com/philosophy/pages/dasein.html

[spiney2]

the russel meinong debate was about the logical status of non existent objects. its just logical structure. the thing itself obvioulsy cant exist.

[simmons_5251]

Originally Posted by bleuh111

Sorry, after you replied, I edited my post this responds to with an addition, which I have also copied below, as you wouldn't have known about it when you replied:

For example, "there is a difference between a square and a circle" - now I'd think that would mean I can truthfully say "a difference between a square and a circle exists", but how can a difference exist? Can a difference be said to exist? After all, I rested my claim that certain models of God fail because they mean God cannot claim to have created the difference between existence and non-existence, yet such a difference clearly exists (God can't take credit because at any point there was no difference, God ceases to exist or not exist and thus can no longer be said to have a will or consciousness to have created anything, was the gist of my arguement there). If a difference can be said to exist, what implications does that have for what we mean by exists and does it change the equivalence of statements of "there is" against "exists"?

EDIT: Perhaps another way of looking at my argument from my previous thread though is that what I can be said to be positing is that it's not so much that "existence exists" or "non existence exists", but that existence and non-existence are two fundamental states of reality from which all else can then be said to either exist or not exist. So it's kind of tempting to say they both "exist", but what I'm really putting forward in my website's claims is those being polarisations of a single transexistential state, so really, in terms of what my site talked about, existence and non-existence should be considered part of that single state rather than things in their own right that can be said to exist or not.

Sorry I've not edited in my response to your edit.

So you think there is an overbearing transexistentialness which belonging to it, all things must be within the realm of existing or not existing, and further that within this branch existence and non-existence should be considered a part of it.

My response to that would be to say how can this transcendental concept of the transexistential be said to neither exist nor not to exist? Maybe it is beyond my human capabilities to conceive such a thing, but could it not be said that the tansexistentialness in itself is not a God?

[spiney2]

garbage.

[bleuh111]

Originally Posted by simmons_5251

Sorry I've not edited in my response to your edit.

So you think there is an overbearing transexistentialness which belonging to it, all things must be within the realm of existing or not existing, and further that within this branch existence and non-existence should be considered a part of it.

My response to that would be to say how can this transcendental concept of the transexistential be said to neither exist nor not to exist? Maybe it is beyond my human capabilities to conceive such a thing, but could it not be said that the tansexistentialness in itself is not a God?

I accept it could be called God if you want to call it that, but my claim is that this transexistential state cannot be described as the Abrahamic God, who has a consciousness and a will and a special covenant with man. A single state could not have a special covenant with man.

What was considered to be highly contentious by other members here was my claim that the Abrahamic God is therefore disproved by virtue of the fact that if non-existence is a fundamental state of reality (that in itself cannot be claimed to exist or not exist), at any point God could be said to exist and not not exist (double negative), God cannot have been responsible for that state of non-existence and yet the mainstream Abrahamic God is defined by having been responsible for all fundamental reality (except God).

[Rafer]

Conciser the Reuleaux drill bit. It's almost a circle, almost a triangle. But cuts a square hole.
Other than that a circle can't be a square any more than the Archbishop Desmond Tutu is the left horn of a Tibetan yak called Steve.

[droogiefret]

Originally Posted by bleuh111

Which of a, b or c do you disagree with then? Yes, wording in the replies to this thread were varied, but it's clear that very few people are willing to claim in earnest that a square that is also a circle exists, could exist, or that the statement "a square that is also a circle exists" is semantically different to the statement "there is a square that is also a circle". And that's all I wanted to know. There isn't any philosophical point, debate, discussion or preconceived ideas coming from me in this thread. I just posed three questions and read the responses, for my own purposes.

Your questions talked about circular squares and squared circles. A square that is also a circle is a different thing altogether.

If you are asking if I regard the word 'is' as semantically identical to the word 'exist', no I don't.

I could look at an experience and say 'There is God' - but I wouldn't necessarily be making a claim that God exists.

[bleuh111]

Originally Posted by droogiefret

Your questions talked about circular squares and squared circles. A square that is also a circle is a different thing altogether.

If you are asking if I regard the word 'is' as semantically identical to the word 'exist', no I don't.

I could look at an experience and say 'There is God' - but I wouldn't necessarily be making a claim that God exists.

Interesting - how do you differentiate, under what circumstances could you say "There is God" and not mean "God exists" (where you are not being ironic)? Also I'm not asking if you think the word "is" means the same as the word "exists", but the proposition "there is" and "exists"

[droogiefret]

Originally Posted by Richard46

OK bleuh but who wrote this essay you where reading?

Wicked Richard. I think I owe you a pint.

[Richard46]

Originally Posted by droogiefret

Wicked Richard. I think I owe you a pint.

I will be taking you up on that

[simmons_5251]

Originally Posted by bleuh111

I accept it could be called God if you want to call it that, but my claim is that this transexistential state cannot be described as the Abrahamic God, who has a consciousness and a will and a special covenant with man. A single state could not have a special covenant with man.

What was considered to be highly contentious by other members here was my claim that the Abrahamic God is therefore disproved by virtue of the fact that if non-existence is a fundamental state of reality (that in itself cannot be claimed to exist or not exist), at any point God could be said to exist and not not exist (double negative), God cannot have been responsible for that state of non-existence and yet the mainstream Abrahamic God is defined by having been responsible for all fundamental reality (except God).

Indeed. I guess it disproves it by showing its a logical impossibility within reason. However, as a sceptic I would suggest we can't be certain that our concept of reason is correct, and therefore it's only a verisimilitude.

[droogiefret]

Originally Posted by bleuh111

Interesting - how do you differentiate, under what circumstances could you say "There is God" and not mean "God exists" (where you are not being ironic)?

For instance an atheist might explain to me some intense experience and I might recognize that as something I would interprete from the position of a believer as an experience of God. But it's clearly not an experience of God for the atheist.

Still, if we are interested in each other I might point out our commonality by saying 'That experience and your response - that's what God is'. But I couldn't possibly say 'God exists' because that would deny the atheist's experience - which had no God in it.

[droogiefret]

Originally Posted by Richard46

I will be taking you up on that

Yea!!! No more arguing for a while then I need to keep my hair dry.

[bleuh111]

Originally Posted by simmons_5251

Indeed. I guess it disproves it by showing its a logical impossibility within reason. However, as a sceptic I would suggest we can't be certain that our concept of reason is correct, and therefore it's only a verisimilitude.

I accept my concept of reason is correct because if you reject foundational deduction and induction, the laws of the universe cannot make sense and therefore cannot be, which would mean I would only not exist. In terms of epistemology, I can see your point, but you only have a point if your own concept of reason is correct. So to me, I can't concern myself with that kind of chaos - I don't have the luxury. For anything to make sense, I have to assume it's true my concept of reason is reasonable (that of course does not mean I would always be right about something, just that I can trust my brain when it tells me fire is hot, because it was always hot before).

[simmons_5251]

Originally Posted by bleuh111

I accept my concept of reason is correct because if you reject foundational deduction and induction, the laws of the universe cannot make sense and therefore cannot be, which would mean I would only not exist. In terms of epistemology, I can see your point, but you only have a point if your own concept of reason is correct. So to me, I can't concern myself with that kind of chaos - I don't have the luxury. For anything to make sense, I have to assume it's true my concept of reason is reasonable (that of course does not mean I would always be right about something, just that I can trust my brain when it tells me fire is hot, because it was always hot before).

When i want truth, i search only for the purest truth, unadulterated by doubt or experience.

I don't see why i would have to be reasonable to doubt my sense of reason. An unreasonable doubt is still a doubt.

[skipjack79]

Apologies for what may appear to be the promotion of one of my videos, but it reveals the only possible way you'll ever see a square circle

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g5J6qAELSTU

[jenzie]

a square will ALWAYS be a shape with four sides and four corners, equidistant to each other
a circle will ALWAYS be a shape, where there are no corners, and all points perpendicular are equidistant to each other

no matter what "effect" you put on them to make it "look" like the other

[bleuh111]

Originally Posted by simmons_5251

Yes to me there is a difference, yet a difference does not exist. Existence implies an instance, yet is implies the concept (to me). There is a logical jump created by the mind in perceiving two things to pertain a difference, personally I think the mind is a concept rather than an instance, and therefore I'm inclined to think that the difference is also a concept which exists only in the mind, not in reality.

But doesn't that mean that what you're saying is equivalent to the statement that in fundamental reality, independent from any person's mind, there cannot be said to be a difference between anything? I would be instinctively inclined to argue that the difference between my existing and not existing is independent of whether I perceive difference. But then I define fundamental reality by the difference between existing and not existing, so I cannot accept that such a difference is only in my mind, because that would suggest to me that fundamental reality is only in my mind and I'm not a solipsist - I take it as an axiom that there is a reality independent of my mind, as my mind must belong to a reality to exist (again necessitating that one way or another, there is such a thing as not existing).

[simmons_5251]

Originally Posted by bleuh111

But doesn't that mean that what you're saying is equivalent to the statement that in fundamental reality, independent from any person's mind, there cannot be said to be a difference between anything? I would be instinctively inclined to argue that the difference between my existing and not existing is independent of whether I perceive difference. But then I define fundamental reality by the difference between existing and not existing, so I cannot accept that such a difference is only in my mind, because that would suggest to me that fundamental reality is only in my mind and I'm not a solipsist - I take it as an axiom that there is a reality independent of my mind, as my mind must belong to a reality to exist (again necessitating that one way or another, there is such a thing as not existing).

Epistemologically how are you to know difference without experiencing it? Unless difference is a synthetic a priori?

It is only the minds existence which necessarily leads to the difference you perceive to exist. Whether that difference is there regardless of the mind cannot be known without transcending oneself's mind.

EDIT: There is not a physical thing for which you can label this is a difference. Difference is a concepts, and concepts exist purely in the mind, or a transcendent world of forms if you're Plato

Difference may be, but it does not exist. Something can be said to "be" a difference between two things, yet the difference itself is not an independent thing. You cannot have difference on its own without corresponding parts by which to label different.